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The EU prizes the freedom of movement its citizens enjoy. Yet this depends on securing ‘Fortress Europe’
against non-Europeans – including the thousands who drown trying to cross the
Mediterranean. Claire Sutherland asks how the Union can tolerate squalid migrant camps
that are, in the words of its own migration commissioner, ‘an insult to our values and
civilisation’.
At the end of the Cold War, and on the breakup of Yugoslavia, the EU offered Ukraine the
tantalising prospect of membership – or at least partnership – and thus a share in what
Ukrainians apparently wanted. As José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European
Commission, made clear: ‘They want freedom, they want prosperity, they want stability’. European flags waved in
the streets of Kiev were greeted as ‘stars of hope’ and signs of Ukrainians being ‘part of the European family’, a
sentiment even echoed by then UK Prime Minister David Cameron.
Spool forward to 2016 and it could be argued that migrants at the gates of Europe want nothing different, regardless
(for once) of whether they are classed as economic migrants or asylum seekers. Nor do those European citizens
travelling freely to teach English in Bulgaria, service boilers in the UK or retire to Spain.
Sailors and Royal Marines help migrants ashore in Italy, 2015. Photo: Royal Navy Media Archive  via a CC-BY NC 2.0 licence
What makes the EU’s interpretation and facilitation of these pretty universal human desires so different from place to
place? What is the moral justification for the further securitisation of ‘Fortress Europe’ in order to save the Schengen
agreement? Why is Schengen worth saving more than the souls reaching the shores of Spain, Greece and Italy and
the many thousands more who have drowned, predictably and avoidably, since and despite the short-lived moral
outrage caused by Alan Kurdi’s death? Why is this so-called ‘crisis’ repeatedly presented as a zero-sum game of
either stability or humanity, suggesting that ‘having it all’ is impossible?
The discourse about the security of the EU’s borders certainly has a nationalist ring. The sole basis of EU solidarity
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on this issue is to keep the ‘Other’ out and erect a solid barrier between ‘us’ and ‘them’, while the infighting
continues unabated. Continentalism is being played out judicially and politically across the EU. The freedom of
movement accorded citizens of the Schengen zone is dependent on the securitisation of its common external border
against the unwanted ‘Other’.
Migration and asylum only became part of EU affairs as a result of the Tampere European Summit in 1999. The
summit signalled a diplomatic move from low to high politics that – as the EU’s ongoing difficulties in agreeing and
enforcing a common response to unabated migrant arrivals show – is not reflected in the reality of current
immigration policy or crisis management. The EU’s inability to overcome its member states’ aversion to ‘burden-
sharing’ and redistributing asylum seekers across its territory has been taken to indicate the exhaustion of the
European integration project itself.
In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the so-called migrant ‘crisis’ and Britain’s vote to leave the EU, member states’
reassertion of principles of national homogeneity and sovereignty has been seen to trump intra-European solidarity,
leading to its paralysis and the rise of populist, right-wing parties offering clear, simplistic and divisive answers to the
uncertainties of our age. At the end of August 2015, as Chancellor Angela Merkel temporarily opened Germany’s
borders to those fleeing Syria’s civil war, her statements suggested that ‘the Europe we want’ is one that upholds
human rights and noble values. At the same time, the use of the first-person plural ‘we’ denotes an imagined
community at the EU level, which necessarily excludes its constitutive ‘Other’. Confronted with that ‘Other’,
variously imagined as the poor, the persecuted or the supposedly culturally alien, EU countries have proved either
openly xenophobic or singularly unwilling to articulate the ethical and economic imperatives of accepting migrants
into Europe.
Although clearly not a nation-state, the EU is nonetheless a ‘geo-body’ (Thongchai, 1994; Shore, 2000), which
defines and polices ‘irregular’ migrant flows. Its strictures deem who is ‘irregular’ and its agency, Frontex, enforces
the EU border on land and on sea, sometimes far from the EU’s own territory and territorial waters.
It is useful to consider the EU using Bridget Anderson’s concept of a ‘community of value’. She defines this as
‘composed of people who share common ideals and (exemplary) patterns of behaviour expressed
through ethnicity, religion, culture, or language – that is, its members have shared values’.
To scholars of nationalism, this definition clearly overlaps with some common attributes of nations, and Anderson
acknowledges this.
However, the EU itself also claims to be a community of shared values, as expressed in the 2001 Laeken
Declaration, the 2007 Berlin Declaration, the 2011 GAMM framework, the Copenhagen criteria for accession and the
conditionality it imposes on trade agreements with third countries. It is this community of value on whose behalf then
EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso accepted the Nobel peace prize in 2012 and to which Angela
Merkel doggedly refers. Phrases like ‘Europe’s disgrace’ and ‘shame’ to describe the terrible humanitarian situation
in Idomeni, Lesvos, Chios and elsewhere along the EU’s borders explicitly refer to these putative shared values.
These are values that member states now only honour in the breach of previous resettlement agreements or by
recognising – in the case of Lithuania’s President  Dalia Grybauskaitė – that a deal to swap migrants with Turkey is
‘very difficult to implement and is on the edge of international law’.
Europe’s refugee crisis goes hand in hand with a crisis of European values, and therefore a crisis of the European
community of value itself. In the words of EU migration commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos on visiting the
makeshift camp in Idomeni on the Greek border with Macedonia: ‘The situation is tragic, an insult to our values and
civilisation’. The EU’s current rhetoric surrounding its management of migrants clearly pits everything the EU stands
for against the migrant ‘Other’ as a potential threat to its achievements. In other words, the EU draws a line between
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‘them’ and ‘us’ in the starkest terms. Avramopoulos has also stated:
All that we have achieved in the last 60 years is at stake and we have to do what we can to uphold
and safeguard these achievements.… We cannot have free movement if we cannot manage our
external border effectively.
At the same time, the EU has been gripped by a prolonged series of so-called ‘crises’, such as the euro crisis. This
is a widespread but risky nomenclature that, in turn, authorises ‘emergency’ measures. The migration ‘crisis’ that led
to a ‘one in, one out’ bargain with Turkey was presented as a way of undermining smugglers’ business model, when
surely a more effective way of doing so would have been to ensure migrants’ safe passage to European shores and
processing them there. A simple ferry ticket is the failsafe way to disrupt the market in ropey dinghies and useless
lifejackets, and to save lives at sea. Instead, the EU and member-state leaders continue to stand by in the full
knowledge that men, women and children are dying unnecessarily, while heaping moral opprobrium on smugglers.
The hypocrisy here is quite breathtaking. The European ideal has sunk to the bottom of the Mediterranean with
those lives lost. An organisation much maligned for its bureaucracy has failed to organise, failed to cooperate and
failed to save lives, while migrants continue to perish at sea. The decision to repurpose humanitarian aid that was
originally ring-fenced for third countries to within its own borders is a not inconsiderable acknowledgement of the
EU’s failure to act, but even this has not effectively addressed the shocking conditions in Idomeni and elsewhere.
The grim determination of migrants who continue to die in or around the Channel Tunnel, who doughtily march
around the fences erected before them, or who cross freezing waters with babes in arms to continue their journey
north testifies to their resilience in the face of periodically opening and closing borders and crude categorisations in
terms of nationality, not need. The violence inherent in border securitisation and enforcement has become more
visible, and is no longer confined to the Mediterranean. Member states like Hungary have begun to defend ‘Fortress
Europe’ with tear gas, riot police and automatic detention. In the EU’s case, internal harmony is clearly dependent on
keeping foreigners at bay, and the two are explicitly linked in its rhetoric.
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